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John Lindsay, the Association for a Better New York, and the Privatization 
of New York City, 1969-1973 
 
The privatization of public safety and public space have become regular features of urban life 
in contemporary New York City. These trends are evident in the policing of upscale housing 
projects and cultural attractions or in the proliferation of Business Improvement Districts 
(BIDs), each with their own private security personnel. 1  While direct city investment in 
neighborhood policing remains modest – a surprise 2015 budget increase notwithstanding – 
private consortia such as the New York City Police Foundation, which encourages donors to 
‘Invest in a Safe City’, offer substantive private funding for high-profile public safety projects 
such as the Real Time Crime Center and anti-terror operations at “high-risk” sites such as 
Times Square or the World Trade Center. Programs such as the Lower and Midtown Manhattan 
Security Initiative, a network of 5,000 CCTV cameras and monitoring systems funded by the 
defense contractor Lockheed Martin to protect ‘the City’s major centers of finance, commerce 
and government… and iconic landmarks’, illustrate that the privatization of safety and space, 
and its uneven, often inequitable distribution, is here to stay.2 
 
Many social scientists have conceptualized the emergence of these public-private partnerships 
and privatization strategies by aligning them with what Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore identify 
as ‘the geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism”... a historically specific, ongoing and 
internally contradictory process of market-driven socio-spatial transformation’. For Brenner 
and Theodore, cities such as New York have become ‘institutional laboratories’ for this 
process, creating a brand of urbanism, notable for its uneven and socially regressive impacts, 
which has transformed labor relations, entrenched inequalities of income, space and service 
delivery, and fundamentally remade cities as political, economic and cultural entities.3 Crime 
control and law enforcement are central elements of these neoliberal projects; anxieties over 
crime and disorder have often provided the rationale for privatized urban regeneration, and 
repressive law enforcement and spatial strategies have been pursued to regulate individuals, 
communities and public spaces.4 
 
But up to now the longer-term origins of these projects – and the historical settings in which 
they were conceived – have received relatively limited attention from historians. In their 
exposition of neoliberal urbanism, Brenner and Theodore outline its ‘contextual 
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embeddedness’ and the importance of specific historical contexts in defining the exchanges 
between older urban regimes – often afflicted by crises of governance and legitimacy – and the 
neoliberal ones which have emerged to replace them.5 Historians, with their attentiveness to 
such moments of transition and their longer-term roots or (dis)continuities, are well-placed to 
illuminate the specific contexts or crises in which these exchanges took place, and which 
legitimized or secured consent for new privatized or market-oriented solutions. So how can we 
historicize this process of transformation in urban centers, and the individuals, ideas and 
ambitions behind it? Where did it begin, or grow from, and which historical actors, contexts or 
crises were important in initiating it? 
 
In many studies New York City stands as an ‘iconic case’ in these processes of urban 
restructuring; its privatization taking root, these works suggest, in two discrete phases. First, in 
the aftermath of the 1975 fiscal crisis – typically presented by scholars as the critical watershed 
– a “crisis regime” of corporate interests reoriented the priorities of city government away from 
the provision of public services and redistributive social programs to the stimulation of private 
investment and economic development, transforming post-crisis New York from a cradle of 
egalitarian, public-oriented ‘civic liberalism’ to the privatized, entrepreneurialist ‘neoliberal 
city’ identified by David Harvey and Jason Hackworth.6 Second, the later administrations of 
Rudolph Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg furthered these trends by developing what Alex 
Vitale describes as a ‘quality of life paradigm’; preserving, even expanding the new regime 
(and excluding those who threatened to disrupt it) via punitive approaches to crime and disorder 
and the extensive surveillance and privatization of public space; blurring the lines between 
crime control and urban development and developing a punitive, rather than ameliorative, role 
for city government.7 Taken together, these two phases have contributed to an increasingly 
‘privatized’ New York in which, even if crime has been reduced, once-public goods, spaces 
and services – including, in select parts of the city, the provision of public safety – are now 
controlled, supplemented or delivered by the private sector; often, as Sharon Zukin notes, at 
the expense of social equality and diversity.8 
 
Yet whilst these developments are vitally important, the roots of New York’s privatization can 
be traced to earlier than this, and a perhaps unlikely figure. It was liberal mayor John Lindsay, 
an impassioned advocate of public intervention in urban problems and an inclusive, public city, 
who, in his partnership with the Association for a Better New York [ABNY] and development 
of public-private anti-crime initiatives in the early 1970s, initiated the privatization of public 
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safety and space in New York. 9  Rather than a flailing advocate of an exhausted urban 
liberalism, as he is often presented, Lindsay offered what Themis Chronopoulos identifies as 
‘a new standard of urban governance’ – specifically a sensitivity to the kinds of public-private 
collaborations, economic development innovations and spatial strategies identified with 
today’s “actually existing neoliberalism” – in his quest for a vital and prosperous New York.10 
Lindsay’s outlook as a Republican ‘progressive’, committed to activist government but also 
the development of business partnerships, complemented many of these initiatives.11 Yet he 
also encapsulates many of the “internally contradictory” qualities of urban neoliberalism: a 
decentralizer of government who expanded its regulatory, even repressive authority; idealistic 
about the redemptive power of the state but also the private sector; and while genuinely 
committed to the democratic, public potential of the city, cognizant, as Lizabeth Cohen and 
Brian Goldstein argue, of the need to preserve New York’s status as a center of private 
investment and elite consumption.12 Thus Lindsay could remain committed to a city in which 
government served as a vehicle for expanded public participation, whilst also laying the 
foundations for the privatized New York to come.  
 
Yet while Lindsay’s privatization of crime control and public space was consistent with his 
own ideological outlook, it was also, to borrow from Brenner and Theodore, contextually 
embedded: it reflected, and was often driven by, the historically specific environment in which 
he governed. As mayor Lindsay was confronted by a series of interwoven crises: a gathering 
fiscal crisis which threatened to rout city budgets and render the costs of existing city services 
impossible; a crisis of public institutions, notably paralysis and dissent within the public law 
enforcement agencies for which Lindsay was responsible; and a crisis of crime – heightened 
public and corporate anxiety over street crime and disorder – which threatened the city’s social 
and economic health and played into wider anxieties about New York as the exemplar of an 
intractable “urban crisis”. Severely constrained by these crises, the dynamics of which 
disempowered public authorities and solutions and embedded a pejorative vision of Lindsay’s 
“public city” as open, chaotic and unmanageable, the mayor turned to private sources of 
assistance; sources whose privatist solutions, within that same context, grew to feel 
increasingly urgent, and whose motivations were far less contradictory.  
 
ABNY was one of New York’s first public-private partnerships, but as with Lindsay its agency 
in the rise of urban neoliberalism is less well-documented. The few existing accounts of its 
work have emphasized the importance of image-making activities such as publicity stunts or 
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urban marketing campaigns, each tantamount to ‘cheerleading’ for New York at a time of 
severe financial and political uncertainty or, worse, ‘selling snake oil’ – a confidence trick 
designed to obscure the city’s fiscal realities. Yet while such initiatives were undoubtedly 
significant, countering pejorative images of New York and buying ABNY influence, the 
evidence of its efforts to advance, through its own anti-crime programming, the privatization 
of public safety, space and services, is suggestive of something greater than simply ‘effective 
PR’.13 ABNY’s programs were not only symbolic attempts to improve urban life or restore 
investor confidence in the city, but also ideological projects: a means of visibly asserting the 
efficacy and authority of private or voluntarist solutions over their public equivalents, 
reorienting municipal priorities away from redistribution towards the promotion – or protection 
– of private accumulation, growth and development (often of its own assets), and restructuring 
New York’s political, economic and spatial order.14  In its anti-crime collaborations with 
Lindsay we can identify more than PR or “cheerleading”: a new and often unequal model of 
public-private collaboration through which private interests could secure policy goals and 
resources; the formulation, often through highly visible, performative programs and publicity, 
of a new, assertive and popular “common sense” for urban governance; and an attempt to 
reclaim or redefine the purpose of the contemporary city.15 Their collaboration subsequently 
provided a powerful template both for the post-fiscal crisis restructuring of the late 1970s and 
1980s and today’s “actually existing neoliberalism”, anticipating New York’s shift to market-
led solutions and privatization. 
 
*** 
 
John Lindsay was elected mayor of New York City in 1965, at the apogee of the post-war faith 
in the ability of public policy to confront urban problems and the emancipatory potential of the 
“public city”.16 In Washington, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society committed the nation to a raft 
of unprecedented federal programming and investment – $14 billion by the end of the 1960s – 
in the nation’s cities.17 Johnson’s legislative program sought to eradicate the full gamut of 
urban ills, from racial and educational inequality to poverty and crime, and communities 
enjoyed “maximum feasible participation” in the distribution of public funds. 
Contemporaneously, rights-based social movements sought to expand the definition of the 
“public” in the nation’s urban areas, opening up cities to new and diverse groups of residents 
and ensuring their participation in a more democratic, egalitarian urban culture.  
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The New York Lindsay inherited exemplified many of these trends. Successive administrations 
committed themselves to the provision of an unrivalled range of publicly-accessible services 
for a diverse citizenry, offering what Joshua Freeman identifies as a ‘social democratic polity 
unique... in its ambition and achievements’.18 Civil rights protests, including riots which swept 
through Harlem in 1964, demanded the expansion of the public realm – and public protections 
– to include racial minorities. After the centralized urban renewal projects of the post-war 
years, neighborhood activist Jane Jacobs gave voice to a demand for greater public 
participation in urban planning, transferring power away from the city’s political and financial 
elites towards communities. At the same time, Jacobs also valorized the public spaces of those 
communities – most famously the ‘intricate sidewalk ballet’ of her own Hudson Street in 
Manhattan’s Greenwich Village – for creating a ‘lively, diverse, intense’ urban order. Such an 
order, she concluded, made for safer, more liveable and above all public cities.19 
 
Lindsay, who appointed Jacobs to his first housing task force and had served in the Kennedy 
and Johnson Congresses, inhabited this same milieu.20 From his 1965 declaration of candidacy, 
where he declared, ‘Cities are for people and for living’, to his first day as mayor, where he 
invited all New Yorkers to attend his inauguration, Lindsay spoke consistently of the 
importance of public participation in urban life and the need to create a liveable, public city for 
all.21  His flamboyant Parks Commissioner Thomas Hoving sought to get the city’s Parks 
Department ‘out from behind its chain-link fence’ and ‘closer to the people’, organizing public 
“happenings” in Central Park and replacing the “No” signs in the city’s parks and beaches with 
“Enjoy”.22 Hoving’s successor, August Heckscher, recalled that under Lindsay, ‘People in 
great numbers and of all varieties came out into the parks and squares and streets, and there 
they professed the values they lived by, exhibited the latest fads and fashions, paraded, 
demonstrated, walked, bicycled, made love, just sat.’23 Likewise, Mariana Mogilevich has 
illustrated how Lindsay’s arts policy initially conceptualized the arts as a democratic ‘vehicle 
of inclusion’ and, in its decentralization of installations and public events, ‘sketched  the 
promise of a better, more inclusive city to come.’24 Lindsay’s Operation Main Street, which 
sponsored new lighting, temporary street festivals and pedestrian malls in fifteen local 
shopping areas across the city, also reflected the mayor’s desire to open up New York to a 
diverse citizenry and maximize public participation within it. 25  Even Lindsay himself 
personified this ideal of an inclusive, public city – in his walking tours of non-white 
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neighborhoods, or images of the mayor ice-skating or leading a “bicycle be-in” in Central Park 
– each with the aim of expanding “the public”. 
 
Yet Lindsay was aware that his “public city” could not flourish without the lifeblood of 
economic investment. While federal urban aid remained forthcoming until the end of the 1960s, 
structural economic changes and the potential flight of capital and affluent citizens from the 
city presented public officials with a significant challenge to maintain growth and development. 
A concomitant, often racialized discourse of “urban crisis” afflicting American cities, 
symbolized by racial unrest, poverty and crime, established an image of urban areas, and New 
York in particular, as unstable or unsafe.26 For Lindsay, these concerns could be assuaged by 
accentuating the intrinsically positive features of living and doing business in New York (what 
David Harvey calls ‘the political economy of place’); creating visitor-oriented attractions 
emphasizing ‘spectacle and display’ (the “happenings”, cycling “be-ins” or pedestrian malls); 
and forging close links with the city’s corporate sectors – each elements of the ‘entrepreneurial 
stance’ identified by Harvey and Hackworth as central to neoliberal urban governance.27 Such 
initiatives, Lindsay envisaged, would rebut the “urban crisis” narrative whilst retaining his 
commitment to a public city. And as discussed, they did not conflict with but in fact 
complemented Lindsay’s own worldview. On the campaign trail in 1965 the would-be mayor 
blamed industrial relocations on taxes, ‘red tape… and harassment on the part of city 
government’, praising business as ‘a valued ally’. And in 1966 Lindsay created an Economic 
Development Council [EDC] with business leaders to secure a ‘favorable business climate’ in 
New York – a “climate”, the EDC envisaged, of reduced regulation, a reduced municipal 
services burden, and ‘responsible’ City budgets. This message was reiterated to business 
leaders throughout Lindsay’s first term via a series of city-sponsored campaigns and appeals – 
state legislation prohibited direct inducements such as tax incentives – and anticipated his later 
work with ABNY.28 
 
However, Lindsay’s attempts to secure both economic development and an open, inclusive city 
were not aided by escalating anxieties over New York’s future by the late 1960s. Racial 
conflict, deindustrialization and suburban flight afflicted many major cities, but New York’s 
size, visibility and symbolic power – reflected both in its model of “civic liberalism” and 
Lindsay’s pursuit of a public city – plus its proximity to major cultural and media industries, 
ensured its difficulties were more widely consumed than others’. Chief among these anxieties 
was the city’s reputation for crime.  In his 1969 treatise, The City, Lindsay wrote:  
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‘The key cost of crime is what it does to us as... members of a community. It puts us 
behind the locked doors of our homes and apartments and turns night time in the city 
into a time of fear. It... wipes away our legal right to move freely, to assemble, and to 
use our environment with any confidence.’29 
 
For Lindsay, the New York of the 1960s reinforced this privatization of civic life. Violent crime 
in New York had increased 7 percent year on year during the early 1960s, murders had more 
than doubled, and sensationalized press coverage established an image of the city as violent 
and lawless, its citizens helpless in the face of rampant crime.30 As part of a wider ‘New York 
City in Crisis’ series in 1965, the New York Herald Tribune luridly documented ‘a city where 
no one is a complete stranger to violence’, noting a new trend for private security guards and 
vigilante block patrols; its readers revealed ‘a city besieged’ and frightened, enfeebled residents 
confined to ‘self-imposed prison[s]’ and ‘afraid of my own shadow’.31 In truth, the candidate 
Lindsay had himself helped to construct this image of fear and self-enforced privatization: city 
streets, he declared during the 1965 campaign, were ‘dirty and unsafe’; crime ‘rampant’; parks 
and playgrounds ‘dangerous and uninhabitable’. New Yorkers, his own white paper on crime 
declareddecried, had become ‘prisoners in their own city’.32 Yet such fears threatened to derail 
the kinds of public participation Lindsay envisaged for New York, and reaffirm the city’s 
unwanted exogenous reputation for crime and danger. 
 
Lindsay’s initial prescriptions for combating crime were explicitly public, conveying both his 
own optimism in the ameliorative power of government and his commitment to a public city. 
In Brooklyn, Lindsay admonished local residents who had organized a vigilante patrol to deter 
crime, instead heralding the ability of the state to provide for public safety. ‘Safety is the job 
of the city, not the individual’, he averred. 33 The mayor pursued crime control policies which, 
whilst addressing rising crime, would also seek to restore public faith in public institutions and 
spaces: communication innovations such as the 911 line and SPRINT system to improve 
coordination between the public and law enforcement, or new technologies such as scooters 
and one-man patrol cars to increase police visibility in public spaces.34 Public anxieties would 
be assuaged through a number of citizen-led crime prevention campaigns, each designed to 
empower and embolden residents. The 1969 “Lights On” campaign committed business 
owners to leaving a light on in their stores overnight to deter burglaries, while Operation Main 
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Street invested in street safety, lighting and shopfront renovation to increase public confidence 
in their urban environment.
 35 
 
But Yet by the end of his Lindsay’s first term, Lindsay faced a number of challenges to these 
assumptionsmany of these explicitly public instruments appeared increasingly unattainable. 
First, he the mayor no longer possessed the public resources to pay for some of his more 
ambitious initiatives. Between 1961 and 1975, municipal spending, especially on redistributive 
social welfare programs for a population that was increasingly poor and non-white, more than 
doubled to 15.4 percent of residents’ income, encouraged by a vocal welfare rights 
movement.36 As public expenditure outpaced tax revenues and economic growth, Lindsay was 
forced to deliver a number of self-proclaimed ‘realistic’ or ‘austerity’ budgets from 1968 that 
while protecting such programs, reduced spending on policing and crime control.37 Police 
officers were withdrawn from the streets, precinct houses merged or closed, and innovative 
anti-crime technologies deemed unaffordable. In August 1968, Budget Director Frederick 
Hayes advised Police Commissioner Howard Leary that current city funds were ‘inadequate to 
continue existing [police] programs at current levels’, even encouraging the Commisioner to 
‘take advantage of funding sources other than the City.’. 38  The success of Lindsay’s 
conservative rivals in the 1969 mayoral election, both of whom linked increased crime to 
Lindsay’s “permissiveness” on social welfare and urban disorder, indicated a significant 
number of New Yorkers were increasingly receptive to political messages which suggested an 
expanded public realm was increasingly irreconcilable with public safety.39 
 
Relations between Lindsay and the Police Department were also poortroubled. Lindsay’s initial 
attempts to reform an entrenched bureaucracy by rationalizing the allocation of resources and 
increasing public oversight generated accusations of City Hall interference, culminating in the 
resignation of his Police Commissioner and other senior officers in 1966. A bruising 
referendum campaign over a proposed civilian complaint review board the same year, which 
played on white New Yorkers’ racial anxieties and placed the administration and the 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association on opposite sides, ended in a crushing defeat for the 
administration and increased racial and political polarization, while City Hall and police 
officers also clashed over an official “restraint” policy in the face of recent riots and disorder.40 
As the credit squeeze worsened the mayor’s attempts to apply a ‘cost effectiveness policy’ to 
the department conflicted with the police unions’ calls for increased manpower to combat 
9 
 
crime, whilst the breakdown of wage and contract negotiations between city government and 
the police led to a wave of work slowdowns throughout 1967 and 1968 and wildcat strikes by 
up to 20,000 officers in January 1971.41 Such conflict further worsened city-police relations 
and rendered increases in police manpower politically unfeasible for Lindsay. Public attitudes 
towards the police also suffered. M; many communities, especially those of color, viewed the 
police with distrust, and ; at a 1968 city conference on crime, delegates revealed a negative 
regard for the Police Department and blamed its incompetence inefficacy – and city 
government – for the rising crime rate, while press revelations of systematic sleeping on duty 
(“cooping”) by patrolmen and endemic police corruption entrenched an image of institutional 
incompetence and venality..42 Such a context worked served to diminish many New Yorkers’ 
confidence in public institutions and officials, rendering attempts at developing citizen-led anti-
crime campaigns all the more difficult, and increased public skepticism towards solutions 
which augmented them. 
 
Finally, Lindsay’s tenure had overseen little in the way of a reduction in crime in the city. The 
rate of violent, predatory crime had quadrupled in New York during the second half of the 
1960s, and by 1969 it ranked fourth amongst American cities for crimes per capita. And rather 
than opening up the city, many of Lindsay’s crime control innovations conspired to work 
against his goal of an inclusive, public New York. Initiatives such as the 911 line or one-man 
patrol cars had transformed policing into a reactive process and distanced the police from the 
public, increasing fear of crime.43 In June 1969 the Times documented the effect of these 
anxieties, privatizing civic life and turning citizens in on themselves:  
 
‘The fear [of crime] is visible. It can be seen in clusters of stores that close early because 
the streets are sinister and customers no longer stroll after supper for newspapers and 
pints of ice cream. It can be seen in the faces of women opening elevator doors, in the 
hurried step of the man walking home late at night from the subway… [and] finally it 
becomes habit.’44  
 
Not only had the Lindsay administration proven unable to ease New Yorkers’ anxieties over 
rising crime, but by the early 1970s these fears were also being articulated by voices from 
outside the city. Between 1969 and 1972 just three firms moved their offices into New York, 
compared to 94 leaving, with crime and disorder frequently cited as significant reasons for 
these trends.45  A 1970 investigation into the city’s declining share of domestic air travel 
identified ‘a conscious avoidance of New York by businessmen’, due to ‘the negative image 
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of New York created by... danger, crime, social unrest’. A 1971 tourism conference convened 
by the administration revealed considerable tourist anxiety over crime and security in Midtown 
Manhattan, and discussed a network of buses which would allow visitors to forego its streets. 
The president of Richardson-Merrell Corp., announcing plans to leave New York, decried the 
‘the quality of urban living and the fact that… doing business in New York City affected 
employees, especially... [retaining] middle and upper-level people’.46 Lindsay was not blind to 
the threat these trends posed to his dream of a public and prosperous New York, nor the 
symbiotic relationship between public perception or fear of crime and economic development. 
In the winter of 1969-70 he intervened when realtors and business owners in downtown 
Brooklyn reported an upsurge in street crime – personally dispatching a police delegation and, 
breaking from his quest for cost-effectiveness, temporarily increasing police protection – 
largely to deter relocations.47 Having But having sought to establish his vision of New York as 
a public city, Lindsay now struggled to combat a powerful, competing image of the city as 
unruly, ungovernable, even lawlessout of control; its public officials and institutions, like its 
citizens, helpless in the face of group conflict, bureaucratic inertia, fiscal turmoil and rising 
crime. Such: an image which reaffirmed the racialized, anti-urban tropes of “urban crisis”, 
prioritized affluent, often corporate or visitor anxiety over crime and disorder, and threatened 
the city’s economic wellbeing, even survival. It was apparent that if Lindsay was to retain 
business confidence and investment in New York, the provision of safety and security had to 
become the highest of public goods, regardless of the cost to wider public participation in city 
life.  
*** 
*** 
 
Against this backdrop, and with public solutions unfeasible or unavailable, Lindsay turned to 
a new source: the Association for a Better New York [ABNY]. Established in late 1970 under 
the leadership of real estate executive Lewis Rudin, this civic advocacy group represented over 
300 CEOs from the finance, real estate and hospitality sectors. It boasted a budget of 
$2.5million, funded through the individual donations of its members, initially targeted largely 
towards city marketing and lobbying.51 Its stated mission was to ‘establish a better positive 
image for New York’ and reverse the exodus of corporations, investors and tourists from the 
city. Self-interest formed a large part of the motivation for the group’s formation; many 
members were realtors whose properties would fall vacant should businesses leave the city and 
demand for office space fall flat. A telegram inviting business leaders to the group’s first 
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meeting in December 1970 promised ‘direct and immediate action to hold existing businesses 
in New York City’ and warned, ‘to protect your investment it is of vital importance you 
attend.’52 Other members envisioned the organization as ‘a vehicle for business’ and realized 
long-standing policy aspirations – a West Side convention center, abolishing property tax 
surcharges or relaxing rent controls or zoning restrictions on the construction of luxury housing 
–– could be better advanced through greater cooperation with city government.53 
 
Yet while such imperatives – improving New York’s image, self-interest, business lobbying – 
demonstrated some continuity from pre-existing public-private collaboration in the city, 
ABNY also offered something more novel. As its vice-chairman, realtor Rexford Tompkins, 
outlined, ‘If we’re just going to be a booster club, who needs it? What we’re trying to do is get 
a “business presence” in New York problems.’54 In a number of often performative, visually 
powerful initiatives, from street-sweeping CEOs and uniformed sanitation teams to private 
security guards and anti-crime patrols, ABNY was able to assert, even construct, a new 
“common sense” of private intervention and leadership in combating urban ills, often in 
contrast to an ineffectual or fiscally and politically constrained city government. It addressed 
what it defined as ‘the need for positive action by the private sector against forces which 
threaten the well-being and future of the city’; forces which, its own publicity made clear, 
represented not only urban problems but a perceived diminution in the power of private 
interests vis-à-vis public interest groups, unions or city agencies. 55  Thus ABNY’s 
programming sought not only to advance aspects of the business community’s agenda, but also 
reorient policy priorities and power away from public interests towards private actors and 
fashion an alternative ideological vision for urban governance in New York.56 
 
To develop this legitimacy, early ABNY correspondence constructed its own image of crisis 
and urgency, and positioned itself as a more knowledgeable and effective instrument than city 
government for confronting the city’s problems. ‘New York City is in crisis – an ever-
deepening crisis – until something is done and done fast to reverse this trend’, declared a letter 
to Commercial Properties Association members in late 1970. ‘We in the Real Estate industry 
must now take the lead’. ‘ABNY’s members knew the root causes for dissatisfaction among 
corporate executives. They knew what had to be done to make New York better. And they 
started to do it’, proclaimed its 1972 annual report, contrasting its innate, on-the-ground 
expertise with the remote, aloof ‘indifference of City agencies.’57 While ABNY emphasized 
the importance of working in partnership with the city to deliver common goals, it also often 
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deliberately used effective publicity to promote itself as an alternative center of authority in 
New York. One such example was its recruitment and public presentation of former city 
officials, including former Lindsay ally and Deputy Mayor Robert Sweet and labor negotiator 
Vincent McDonnell, as an alternative ‘shadow cabinet’ of consultants.58 
 
ABNY also established popular legitimacy for its initiatives by directing them towards ordinary 
New Yorkers. While its targeting of political and economic elites through “power breakfasts” 
and lobbying has been documented elsewhere, ABNY also communicated directly with the 
public through local media, from newspaper and television interviews to radio phone-ins, 
establishing a tentative popular consent behind its programs.59  ABNY officials used such 
settings to defend themselves against accusations of self-interest, instead aligning the interests 
of the city’s business and real estate elite with that of the city at large. ‘We’re protecting our 
investments’, Rudin acknowledged when asked to explain ABNY’s intervention in urban 
problems in a 1971 interview. ‘But if my protecting my investments makes it better for 
everyone in this town, is that wrong?’ Capital accumulation and the wider policy goals of real 
estate, in Rudin’s vision, could only be of benefit to the city, regardless of any potentially 
regressive or uneven impacts.60 ABNY officials regularly identified themselves as ‘citizens’ or 
‘taxpayers’, eliding public and corporate interests in opposition to city government; elsewhere, 
in an interview with WOR-TV’s “New York Report”, Rudin declared that ‘We [ABNY] in 
essence are the government… You know, we’re the taxpayers and we’re the people’, 
reconfiguring Lindsay’s vision of a democratic, public city. Many New Yorkers responded 
positively to such appeals, identifying Rudin as an ally or partner in their correspondence with 
ABNY and often offering their own personal testimonies of experiences of crime or, in the case 
of a locksmith or a security company, their own expertise in the fight against it. Local civic 
groups such as the Murray Hill Association or VITAL (Volunteers to Improve Third and 
Lexington) volunteered their services in support of ABNY programs. 61  Such strategies, 
exemplified by the recruitment of volunteer “blockwatchers” to combat crime, illustrate 
ABNY’s conscious effort to assert that their initiatives were as much popular as elite projects.  
 
As if to illustrate this apparent synergy between public and business concerns, crime control – 
identified by New Yorkers as the number one public problem facing the city – was established 
as ABNY major area of endeavor.62 It privately cited ‘inadequate police protection (crime and 
drug problem)’ at the top of a list of city problems, while Rudin publicly declared that ‘crime 
in the streets’ was central to ‘companies making their decision to move to Stamford [or] 
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Greenwich’, and that ‘the crime problem’ was the ‘most important priority’, both for public 
and business interests. ‘There’s no question about it’, he told WOR in January 1973. ‘The 
answer to safe streets… better services for the citizens, is more involvement on the part of the 
business community.’63 And ABNY again made effective use of both local media and powerful 
publicity to advance its agenda to a wider public. In late 1972 Rudin and Lindsay unveiled a 
range of new public-private initiatives against crime at a packed press conference in Midtown 
Manhattan. But while both men sat next to each other as allies, the contrast between an 
embattled, constrained city government and an emboldened, optimistic private sector was made 
evident. Rudin set out the importance of fighting crime to restore business confidence in New 
York, and the need for private sector leadership in doing so: ‘Crime… is what is hurting our 
city more than anything else… An all-out commitment of our own resources is mandatory if 
we want to make New York better.’ He proudly identified ‘a new spirit in the city’, and pledged 
an ‘open chequebook’ from business to support it. By contrast, the Manhattan district police 
commander present admitted the city’s 30,000 public police ‘were not able to do the job 
required’ and Lindsay solemnly predicted the likely worsening of crime as city budgets were 
cut and services further reduced.64 Such imagery, both visual and rhetorical, underlined the 
weakness, inefficacy or constraints of public institutions and the urgency, even “common 
sense”, of private solutions. 
 
*** 
 
ABNY consequently developed a number of privatized programs in the areas of crime control 
and public safety, focusing on three main areas: material investment, spatial restructuring, and 
labor and hiring. To compensate for the growing gap in city funding, ABNY offered private 
capital investment in policing. Lindsay had imposed a number of recruitment freezes on the 
Police Department from 1970 onwards as part of a city-directed program of austerity: new 
appointments were deferred or cancelled, municipal funding for the city’s auxiliary police 
terminated completely, and overall officer manpower fell by 6,000 between 1970 and 1972.65 
In early 1970 the administration asked Leary to cut $17.15 million from the police budget – 
most of it set aside for street patrol – despite the Commissioner’s warning that such reductions 
‘would seriously impair departmental operations.’ 66  While unlikely to make up for this 
shortfall, ABNY donations offered an alternative to Lindsay’s budget cuts, recruiting additional 
auxiliary police to improve coverage or investing directly in new crime control equipment.67 
Many of these initiatives were typically public-private collaborations designed to augment 
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rather than undermine city efforts; in 1972 ABNY and City Hall came together to create the 
New York City Police Foundation, designed to raise funds for policing initiatives deemed 
‘impossible to achieve within the department’s budget’.68 Yet the symbolism of such private 
investment, especially at a time when Lindsay was in direct political conflict with the police, 
was not lost on ABNY, and it again made effective use of publicity to illustrate this contrast. 
In 1972 it sponsored a series of television advertising campaigns designed to celebrate the work 
done by public safety agencies and promote a better public understanding of the challenges 
they faced.69 Elsewhere, in the wake of several violent attacks on police officers, including the 
lethal shooting of a patrol officer at the New York headquarters of the Nation of Islam, ABNY 
members used a press conference to present the Police Department with a number of 
bulletproof vests for their rank-and-file.. 70  Despite their undoubted symbolism and 
opportunism, both initiatives publicly demonstrated ABNY’s commitment to law enforcement 
at a time of considerable criticism of its actions and effectiveness, whilst also illuminating the 
breakdown of relations between the mayor and the police – Lindsay had refused to attend the 
dead officer’s funeral – and the growing breach between city government and the agencies 
responsible for public safety.71 
 
ABNY also developed a number of its own anti-crime and public safety programs, with 
significant implications for the politics of labor and space in New York. These privatized 
initiatives, which called upon voluntary and privatized sources of labor, moved to occupy a 
vacuum created by the retrenchment of police manpower and a collapse in public confidence 
in police effectiveness during the early 1970s.72 Not only this, but in focusing resources on the 
commercial districts of Lower and Midtown Manhattan, they served to privatize previously 
public spaces and widen citywide inequalities in service delivery. 
 
For example, Operation Interlock, a new private radio frequency paid for by ABNY, enabled 
private security guards in hundreds of office buildings in Midtown Manhattan to communicate 
directly with police offers at a police substation in Times Square, twenty-four hours a day. 
Companies and building owners could opt in to the program for an annual or $2,000 one-off 
investment in walkie-talkie equipment and technology. In its promotional material ABNY 
described Interlock as ‘the eyes and ears’ of police, enabling officers to intercept crimes in 
progress rather than reacting to their subsequent reporting, and boasted that at less than five 
minutes the response time for calls to Interlock was better than calling 911. 73  The 
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supplementing of publicly-funded patrolmen with private security guards was highly 
significant, especially at a time of growing public distrust in the NYPD, while the fact that 
Interlock enabled its users to bypass the public 911 line and gain direct access to police 
switchboards appeared to legitimize unequal levels of public service provision. The spatial 
implications of the program – and its intended beneficiaries – were perhaps most evident: 21 
of the 35 buildings who participated in the first roll-out of Interlock were located between 46th 
and 55th Streets – including the Rockefeller Center, the New York Hilton and the headquarters 
of CBS and ABC – while Rudin informed reporters that Interlock intended to make Midtown 
‘a closed neighborhood for criminals’ and ‘open it further for tourists’.74  
 
Elsewhere, ABNY lobbying and investment encouraged Lindsay to establish the Times Square 
Development Council, a public-private partnership staffed by representatives from the Police 
Department, city agencies, real estate and business. The TSDC identified itself as ‘working to 
create conditions which will encourage new economic development and sustain existing 
enterprises’ in the heart of Midtown: an area home to New York’s entertainment and sex 
industries but also some of its most valuable real estate.75 The discourses employed by ABNY 
revealed its ambitions for Times Square; an area which, it complained, had long ‘lapse[d] from 
liberty into license’, its once free and public qualities now pejoratively translated as ‘wide-
open’. ABNY’s Aaron Gural, chairman of Newmark & Co. which owned a number of 
properties in the Times Square area, described the proposals as a ‘scalpel’ which would 
surgically remove ‘parasites’ from Times Square; likewise the Council pledged to ‘sanitize’ 
the area and its ‘visual pollution’ and exclude ‘undesirables’ from its public spaces. Its work 
began in 1972 with the creation of two police “super-precincts”, Midtown South and Midtown 
North, to cover the area, doubling the number of patrolmen available. ‘The Midtown area is a 
unique international tourist and business center and ought to reflect the dignity and spirit of the 
city’, Lindsay publicly declared, underscoring its centrality to the external image of New York, 
and he looked forward to it being transferred to ‘good commercial uses’. 76 The increased 
manpower provided by the city and ABNY supported this process of spatial reclamation. Sex 
workers were covertly surveyed and photographed by a Tactical Patrol Force before being 
arrested, often without bail. 77  The infrastructure of the sex industry was dismantled or 
requisitioned by police: notorious theatres and hotels were closed down, police substations 
built on the sites of peepshow halls, and the NYPD Mounted Division opened offices in a 
former massage parlor. Elsewhere a new police unit, the Office of Midtown Enforcement – 
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described by one scholar as a ‘tactical, 20-member legal SWAT team’ – was instructed by 
Lindsay and Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy to ‘saturate’ the area; its ‘battery’ of officers 
making regular sweeps of street peddlers, panhandlers and the homeless from subway 
concourses (‘Operation Safe Passage’) and erecting barricades at the entrances to Times 
Square, reflecting the aggressive repossession, even militarization, of public space.78 In the 
following years, this process would be completed via the implementation of anti-loitering 
legislation, further deployment of private security and, beginning in 1976, the wholesale 
redevelopment of the area by a new public-private partnership, the 42nd Street Development 
Corporation.79 
 
ABNY’s role in regenerating Times Square did not end there. Together with the Midtown 
Realty Owners’ Association, it also provided private finance for the installation of 170 high-
intensity streetlights and two new gutter-cleaning machines for sanitation workers. So 
successful were the machines that other private consortia of ‘concerned companies’ in the area, 
including Bristol-Meyers and American Airlines, sponsored similar private sanitation efforts.80 
And in 1973 ABNY – specifically donations from the Durst and Newmark real estate firms – 
funded, in partnership with the Shubert Theatre group, the city’s first ever CCTV system, 
designed to monitor a five-block area of Midtown between 42nd and 46th Streets; Gural 
described it as ‘equivalent to having a policeman on every corner’. Whilst Lindsay assured 
reporters that New York remained ‘a public city’, the spatial significance of ABNY’s 
investment was clear.81 A once public space, open to those who wished to participate in the 
city’s public life or, alternatively, pursue their own private desires, had now been reclaimed by 
private interests – many of them investors in Times Square real estate – keen to regulate its use 
and the behaviors with which it had become pejoratively associated. Most significantly, 
provision of public safety in the area, once seen as the responsibility of city government, was 
now identified by the Council as ‘increasingly dependent on the cooperation and initiative of 
the private sector’. Even Lindsay himself, while praising ‘the first-rate professionalism of our 
Police Department and city agencies’, admitted public provision could not do it alone: ‘We 
need the help of all concerned private citizens, businessmen and civic groups to help in this 
fight.’82 These changing relations were reflected by the fact the city was unable to fund the 
lighting or cameras itself; its Crime Study Team, which had recommended the cameras as a 
‘key priority’ for the city, had been dissolved during a Lindsay austerity drive in 1969.83 
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While the reclamation of Times Square delivered a reduction in levels of street crime in the 
area, its successes also reflected the changing spatial dynamics of the city. Such was the extent 
of ABNY’s aggressive programming in the area that the director of Lindsay’s Office of 
Midtown Planning and Development noted that rival advocacy groups such as the Broadway 
Association were ‘extremely worried about being squeezed out of [future Times Square 
development]’.84 Such testimony illustrated both the inequities of ABNY’s model of private-
public partnership, and the limited, often competitive, conception of “partnership” implicit 
within it. Equally, at a time of scarce police resources the Times Square project threatened to 
further increase spatial inequalities – especially of service delivery – in the city, focusing law 
enforcement on central areas popular with tourists, businesses and investors. City 
councilwoman Carol Greitzer, of Manhattan’s 2nd District, complained foot patrols of police 
officers would be reallocated to Midtown exactly as ‘hundreds’ of criminals were driven out 
into Greenwich Village and the Upper West Side. And for many the project appeared to 
privatize, even criminalize, ostensibly public spaces. The Times Square CCTV cameras, the 
New York Civil Liberties Union commented presciently, signified ‘a disturbing step toward a 
society where no one will ever know when he’s free from... surveillance’. The area’s spatial 
regulation was decried as ‘an improper use of official power’, as was the new emphasis on 
“quality of life” offences: ‘Unsightliness and seediness is not a crime’, the NYCLU protested, 
instructing Lindsay he should be ‘deal[ing] with the kinds of crimes that have victims’, not 
privatizing city life. 85  This criticism, however, rather missed the point; for ABNY, 
unsightliness was a crime and apparent abstractions such as “quality of life” and “good 
commercial uses” were genuine victims of Lindsay’s excessively public city. 
 
ABNY also transformed the use of labor in public safety provision in New York. As with 
Operation Interlock, this included the augmentation (and at times replacement) of public police 
officers with a private, non-unionized labor force of up to 30,000 volunteer “blockwatchers”, 
auxiliary police, and security personnel. The project had already been piloted in ABNY’s first 
sanitation venture, Operation Clean Sweep, in which the owners of 2,000 office buildings used 
their own staff and volunteers – including many CEOs – to sweep gutters, curbs and sidewalks 
in Midtown Manhattan. As with many other ABNY projects, Clean Sweep was highly 
performative, providing a powerful, populist image of the efficacy of voluntarism and private 
initiative. In December 1972, ABNY extended this initiative into the realm of public safety, 
establishing a privately-funded ‘auxiliary police army’ of over 7,000 doormen, building 
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superintendents and private security guards – nearly half the size of the Police Department’s 
shrinking uniformed patrol force – to police the streets and office buildings of Midtown. As 
with Interlock, more than 2,000 building owners – many of them ABNY members – 
contributed their own funds and staff to the scheme, and paid for the blockwatchers’ training: 
again in contrast to public disinvestment in policing.86 Six months later Lindsay, flanked by 
ABNY members and security guards in front of the Rockefeller Center’s Time-Life building, 
announced plans for a ‘nocturnal anticrime regiment’ of private security guards, equipped with 
walkie-talkies and weapons. 87  The spatial distribution of the blockwatchers, and their 
implications for an inclusive, public city, was again clear. Lindsay’s volunteers would 
concentrate solely on the area of Manhattan from 42nd to 59th Streets and from Second to 
Seventh Avenues, while a new cohort announced by Rudin the following year pledged to 
expand the program only to the “regional subcenters” of real estate, business and commerce 
set out in the 1968 Regional Plan: downtown Brooklyn, Fordham Road in the Bronx and 
Jamaica, Queens.88 At the same time, other localities continued to struggle with the impact of 
city disinvestment in public safety provision and a lack of police coverage or protection. While 
some more affluent neighborhoods could invest in private security for their building or block, 
this did not apply evenly to every community. 
 
Set against the backdrop of layoffs and labor conflict, as well as the ever-deepening budgetary 
crisis, this part-privatization of policing served the immediate fiscal and political interests of 
Lindsay’s administration. At a time of service retrenchment yet also increased demand for 
police protection, encouraging the private sector to pay for their own security in a new form of 
public-private collaboration, exempt from the kinds of collective bargaining agreements and 
pay structures open to the public police, proved very attractive to City Hall.89 But such an 
arrangement also suited ABNY’s wider ideological objectives. In a June 1973 interview to 
promote the “blockwatchers” program, Rudin underlined its voluntarist, self-help ethos and 
envisaged ‘no reason why business groups and community groups and block associations 
should not do the same thing we’re doing.’ ABNY members aligned private initiatives with 
innovation and efficiency, and juxtaposed them with a sluggish, ineffectual public sector. ‘This 
is the kind of attitude that the city has wallowed in for years – let the government do it’, 
exclaimed Alton Marshall, chief executive of the Rockefeller Center. ‘There is no reason... 
why 30,000 private security people can’t be organized to supplement the police. At Rockefeller 
Center we have our own security force.’90 Both men hinted at a broader ideological shift, away 
from the state and public interests towards a new “common sense” regarding the agency, 
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leadership and virtue of the private sector in the identification, design and delivery of urban 
priorities. In this way, ABNY programs functioned as a form of reclamation, in which private 
interests regained control of an unruly, costly, “ungovernable” city and reoriented its priorities, 
be they policy, political, or spatial. Rudin himself made this clear: ‘We’ve allowed the 
politicians – and some of the other groups, the pressure groups – to create diversions from what 
is necessary to make this town run properly’, he told WOR Radio. ‘It’s our obligation now to 
make it run properly.’91 
 
ABNY continued to develop its range of urban programs after Lindsay left office in 1973 and 
as the city’s fiscal crisis – and the retrenchment of city services – worsened. By 1982, Operation 
Interlock covered over 250 hotels, restaurants and commercial buildings in Midtown 
Manhattan, compared to 35 at its inception. ABNY claimed it served as a ‘model’ for similar 
initiatives across the country. ABNY’s 1983 annual report could boast that its private 
“blockwatchers” had handled 2,860 emergency calls and initiated a record 107 arrests in the 
city. Such a record compared favorably with that of a straitened Police Department whose 
manpower levels had been cut by a further third since Lindsay, forcing officers to ignore “low-
priority” crimes.92 Contemporaries, notably the city’s fashion industry, also used ABNY’s 
programs as a template for their own efforts at public-private collaboration in crime control. 
The Garment Center Model Security Program, developed in partnership with a new Office of 
Apparel Industry Planning and Development in City Hall, employed private security and anti-
crime technologies to supplement the local Police Department command post (whose 
manpower was doubled), and a new program of street lighting, two-thirds of which was paid 
for by industry leaders, was established for the area. The program even encouraged local 
businesses to invest in new private sanitation teams, each with their own uniforms and trucks 
to distinguish them from city provision.93 
 
Beyond crime and public safety, ABNY’s programming also extended into new areas, from 
parks and recreation – where ABNY investment in a private Urban Park Rangers Program 
supplemented that of a city Parks Department whose workforce had been reduced by over 30 
percent between 1972 and 1978 – to drug rehabilitation and youth employment. The Park 
Rangers Program followed a similar practical and spatial template to ABNY’s anti-crime 
programming, providing ‘a highly visible presence’ to ensure the ‘safety of the parks’ – 
specifically the high-profile sites of Central Park, Prospect Park and Flushing Meadow – for 
‘tourists and visitors’.94 ABNY officials, including Rudin, were also enlisted to help form the 
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Business/Labor Working Group – later the New York City Partnership, chaired by David 
Rockefeller and comprised of major financial executives – providing another advocacy arm for 
the city’s business and real estate sectors.95 The Group’s first summary report, published in 
1978, echoed ABNY’s earlier approach. Amongst other goals – a West Side convention center, 
further reductions in municipal spending and an end to rent control – it demanded ‘actions on 
“quality of life” in the city’ with the aim of ‘increasing focus on maintaining and attracting 
middle-income families [to New York]’. Crime, it argued, was a ‘basic barrier’ to job creation 
and economic growth, and was ‘driving away tourists and customers’. In response, the Group 
anticipated further and ‘increased private sector assistance to crime prevention programs’, 
including collective security programs for merchants and building owners, increased use of 
private security and media promotion, and a public-private Crime Prevention Council, 
emulating the template conceived by ABNY less than ten years earlier.96  
 
*** 
 
To some scholars, the efforts of ABNY in designing and delivering urban programs have 
appeared as largely symbolic publicity exercises, distinctive for their ‘naiveté’ or worse, “snake 
oil” quality.97 Yet while boosterism and image-making were important elements of ABNY’s 
strategy, to characterize its efforts simply in these terms is to overlook their wider significance. 
At a time of a multifaceted crisis in public service provision, illustrated by the severe fiscal 
cutbacks, labor and group conflict and spiraling crime rates of the Lindsay years, ABNY 
offered active, substantive programs and a new and distinct ideological direction for the city, 
in which private and volunteer initiative would supplement or even supplant the inefficacy, 
inertia and retrenchment of the state and confront the symptoms of the “urban crisis”, notably 
crime and disorder, exacerbated by Lindsay’s excessively public city. While ABNY’s public-
private programming was not completely new to New York, its significance lies in the 
important ideological work it performed: visibly accentuating private sector agency and 
leadership, illustrating popular consent through public and volunteer participation in its 
initiatives, and, in so doing, redefining priorities for urban governance and policy. The 
performative quality of its anti-crime initiatives, their image of effectiveness and action, and 
their apparent acceptance by both political and business elites and ordinary New Yorkers 
provided a powerful template for the restructuring of New York’s political economy and modes 
of governance, even before the 1975 fiscal crisis. Thus while complicating existing narratives 
of New York’s late twentieth century transformation, ABNY’s efforts also illuminate the later 
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and wider privatization of the city – its services and resources, its spaces, its labor relations, 
perhaps even its fundamental purpose – from the late 1970s onwards. 
 
Indeed, the case of ABNY anticipates the later increasing role of the private sector in setting 
policy priorities for city government and delivering public policy initiatives and even services 
itself. Drawing successfully on a perceived crisis of public institutions during the 1970s, in 
particular their ability to finance or manage complex urban problems, ABNY and other private 
interests developed their own privatist solutions to such problems, developing the legitimacy 
to advance other aspects of their agenda, from reduced taxes and zoning regulations to tougher 
approaches to crime, disorder and “quality of life” issues.98 While many of these solutions have 
been defined as private-public partnerships, the conception of “partnership” within them is 
limited; public authorities are typically, in Gregory Squires’ words, the ‘junior partner’ in such 
arrangements, while as evidenced by the Times Square Development Council, most operate 
under a model in which partnerships compete with each other to secure investment and 
resources.99 These trends can also be identified in the changing management of many parks 
and public spaces since the late 1970s – again a pattern encouraged by ABNY through its Park 
Rangers Program or role in Times Square redevelopment – or the contemporary proliferation 
of BIDs, in which private, place-specific consortia of property and business owners compete 
to offer their own range of privatized services, including private security, ‘above and beyond’ 
existing public provision.100  
 
ABNY’s work also illuminates the wider privatization of space, and its inequitable distribution, 
in New York since the 1970s. In their use of electronic surveillance and invasive policing 
techniques at high-profile sites of commerce or tourism, or their sponsorship of privately-
managed urban spaces which merged goals of physical redevelopment with order maintenance 
and public safety, ABNY’s crime initiatives pre-empted the later privatization of public space 
in New York.101 ABNY’s prioritization of public safety programs and resources towards the 
city center also anticipated the changing spatial order of New York since the fiscal crisis, in 
particular the process of disinvestment – or ‘planned shrinkage’ – in poor and low-income 
neighborhoods at the expense of more prosperous or profitable areas.102 Such efforts have, to 
a large extent, successfully reduced crime coincided with the reduction of crime in New York 
and opened up the city, but often in select spaces or to select groups of residents or visitors, 
while often legitimizing spatial inequalities in service delivery. BIDs are again a contemporary 
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example of this, with the more affluent BIDs – mainly those in Lower and Midtown Manhattan, 
where property values are highest – able to offer a wider portfolio of services.103  
  
ABNY’s efforts illustrate the increasingly privatized nature of municipal labor relations in the 
American city of the 1970s. It is significant that ABNY recruited private security guards or 
volunteers not only for its crime control initiatives, but also pursued similar practices in the 
hiring of park rangers and sanitation workers. At a time of generous municipal pay settlements, 
powerful unions and labor conflict and fiscal uncertainty, these privatized workforces, paid for 
by private sources, presented an attractive alternative to both Lindsay and ABNY: practical, 
promising to reduce the cost of city service provision, but also ideological, fragmenting the 
locus of labor power in the city, laying the ground for the trenchant post-fiscal crisis cutbacks 
in the public sector, and entrenching an ideology of self-help and privatism which has, since 
then, encouraged further privatization strategies both top-down and at the grassroots.104 Such 
trends have continued in the years since the 2008 financial crisis, where, as in the early 1970s, 
discourses of scarcity, privatism and efficiency have continued to be deployed by public and 
private authorities to reduce the burden of public service provision and to discipline organized 
labor.
105
  
 
ABNY’s reoriented ideological vision for New York remains perhaps its most significant 
legacy. While John Lindsay imagined a truly public city, with the role of government to expand, 
often through redistributive means, public inclusion and participation within it, ABNY’s 
conceptualization of New York was very different. ‘New York is a valuable piece of real 
estate’, Rudin explained, whose residents’ fortunes were tied to its market value; the role of 
government was thus to promote, and protect, this real estate and its intrinsic value.106 The 
provision of security and the protection of private property was, in this vision, a vital public 
good; thus ABNY’s eliding of public and corporate interests and its desire to augment city 
spending on crime control and public safety, particularly in areas of commercial or financial 
significance, in opposition to Lindsay’s increasing budgetary restraint. Such a shift in priorities, 
developed before the fiscal crisis and its attendant “crisis regime”, continues to resonate in 
post-crisis patterns of public investment. While the scope and redistributive vision of city 
government has largely atrophied dwindled since the 1970s, what remains of public service 
provision is often concentrated on policing and the protection of property and private 
investment. Even the current mayor, a purported throwback to the era of Lindsay and ‘ultra-
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liberal’ extravagance, has found resources for policing and security in a constrained city 
budget, the majority of it directed not towards neighborhoods but high-profile sites in areas of 
premium real estate value and private investment.107 In this sense, the model developed by 
ABNY and, ironically, Lindsay, lives on, even at the cost of a truly public city. 
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